

Ambiguity

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It is well-known that in natural language, ambiguity is ubiquitous. Computational linguistics often reduces treating ambiguity to disambiguation, but it seems unrealistic that humans always (or even mostly) succeed in disambiguating utterances. More realistically, humans can easily handle and accept ambiguity, and they are perfectly able to reason with it. This leaves us with the question of how they do it. There have been various interesting proposals in the literature, all with different fundamental properties, and all with fundamental differences to classical logic. I want to introduce the formal notion of the family of ambiguity logics, and investigate its fundamental properties. I shed some light on its structure and introduce the notion of trustful and distrustful logics, and illustrate how different logics relate to different communicative scenarios. To sum up, this means that there is no correct logic of ambiguity: rather the notion of ambiguous consequence is itself ambiguous, and we need to decide which is the most plausible one to use from case to case.