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Questioning the Canon

Popular Historiography by Women in Britain and Germany (1750-1850)

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Edward Gibbon, David Hume, Jules Michelet and Leopold von Ranke are all well-known and important historians from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who earned fame for their role in the making of modern historiography. They were all men, however. Did women of that period write history? Of course they did, but they solely wrote popular historiography. Women across Europe lacked access to scholarly training until the beginning of the twentieth century. Consequently one cannot find any academic history written by a woman that would belong to the traditional canon of European historiography of that time. This picture alters, however, if we consider historical texts written for non-academic readers. From the second half of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century popular historiography sold very well (Brock 2006: 48) and several authors made a living from their writings – even women (Davis 1980).\(^1\) Thinking of Britain, Catharine Macaulay, Lady Wortley Montague and other women historians instantly cross our minds. Other European countries have their history women too, as can be seen in an excellent issue of the international journal *History of Historiography* (O’Dowd and Porciani 2004). Regarding Germany, however, no names come to mind. Successful female authors, and there were many of them in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany, only wrote fiction. Why?

An adequate answer to this question has to deal with gender questions, with the history of historiography and the professionalization of history as an academic discipline (Epple 2003). A comparison of the British and the German situation will help us to disentangle this confusing complex. I will start by looking at the case of the famous British historian Catharine Macaulay and her female British colleagues. How did they deal with the problem of female authorship? As we will see, this issue leads to some even more difficult and troublesome questions, which were answered by Catharine Macaulay in her masterpiece *The
History of England (Macaulay 1763–83). What is, according to Macaulay, a good historian? How should a good historian tell their story? What is the duty of a good historian? And how does a good historian establish historical truth?

Secondly, and this is the main point of this chapter, I will contrast the British with the German situation. Why do we not find a German Catharine Macaulay? Who actually wrote history in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany? Giving some consideration to the historiography of Leopold von Ranke I try to show why there were no professional women historians. However, if we look beyond the canon we do find a huge number of historical writings by female authors. Women historians of that time were non-professional insofar that writing history was not their academic profession. These women historians did not receive a university education; they did not use a specific historical methodology; and, therefore, they did not meet the requirements of the emerging academic discipline of academic history.

Nevertheless, women wrote history: they wrote about the past and interpreted historical events. Though they were often unskilled historians, they were professional authors and wrote stories to earn a living. These observations will lead me to challenge the male-dominated canon of German historiography from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To learn more about German women historians I will ask the same questions I have already raised about Catharine Macaulay: How do German women historians deal with their female authorship? What do they expect from a good historian? And last but not least: How do they prove the historical truth of their histories? All the German women historians, and the historical narratives which I present here, have been excluded from historical tradition by what I will call the ‘patriarchal’ canon of historiography. This leads me to my last point where I analyse how this exclusion worked and what strategies lay behind it.

Catharine Macaulay and her Female Colleagues in Britain

The first volume of Catharine Macaulay’s History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line was published in 1763. During the next 18 years seven more volumes followed (Macaulay 1763–83). Macaulay began her masterpiece not at all timidly but with the following assertive statement: ‘Though the rectitude of my intention has hitherto been, and, I trust in God! ever will be, my support in the laborious task of delineating the political history of this country’ (ibid.: vii).

Even though Macaulay mentions here and there her inaccuracies of style due to her gender, she leaves us in no doubt about her competence: ‘From my early youth I have read with delight those histories which exhibit Liberty in its most exalted state, the annals of the Roman and the Greek republics. Studies like these excite that natural love of Freedom which lies latent in the breast of every rational being’ (ibid.).
It is therefore hardly surprising that these annals represent the ideals that Macaulay herself wanted to achieve. If it was already remarkable that she announced quite directly her intention to write a political history of her country, it is even more extraordinary that she compares her own history with the annals of the Roman and the Greek republics. With this comparison she implicitly includes herself and other women as citizens in such a republic. After a long introduction, she concludes with an excuse: ‘If I have digressed from the subject I set out with, which was to inform the public of my intention in writing this history, they will, I hope, excuse a warmth which national evils have excited in a breast zealous in the cause of Liberty, and attached with a servant devotion to the civil rights of my country’ (ibid.: xvii).

For Macaulay it is beyond all questions that she was devoted to civil rights and the concept of liberty as strongly as her male colleagues were. For her, writing true history was not a matter of gender but a matter of the correct conviction. The ancient republics remained the famous model English history had to compete with (Wiseman 2001: 186). When Macaulay attacks Hume and his History of England (Hume 1754–62) in the sixth volume of her own work, it is mostly because of his – in her opinion – biased Tory point of view, one which she refutes ardently. She takes it for granted that, while being a woman, she is able to serve her country by helping the public to ‘digest’ the ‘faithful representation of the important transactions of past ages’ (Macaulay 1763–83). According to Macaulay, a good historian is a person who has the true political conviction – which means a Whig conception of the world. For her, a wrong political attitude is synonymous with historical bias and contrary to historical objectivity. Her understanding of prejudice is not embedded in a theory of the possibility of cognition. Macaulay still believed in the existence of an objective truth beyond the subjectivity of the historian. Hume thought that historiography should not intervene in political issues. He was convinced of the existence of an objective historical truth, which would be independent of a historical subject. He found the historical objectivity in the principle of causality.

Neither conviction excluded women theoretically from the production of historiography. From the outset their writing was not classified as dilettante. As to methodology, Macaulay, in a present-day sense, was even more professional than David Hume. Hume did not use primary sources; however, Macaulay’s History of England was based on her own research in the then new British Museum in London, which opened in 1753. This method, as Devoney Looser highlights, did not become a historical imperative for many decades (Looser 2000: 13).

Catharine Macaulay is probably the best known female historian of eighteenth-century Britain, but she is definitely not the only one – think, for example, of Hester Lynch Piozzi, who wrote about world history (Piozzi 1801). There existed a kind of professional network of female historians in the Anglo-Saxon world and Billie Melman has identified sixty-six English speaking women
historians during the nineteenth century who wrote 782 books (Melman 1993). Women not only made history, they have also been writing history. For a British audience this is hardly a revolutionary idea. Maybe one could question whether British female historians were seen to be as important or as influential as their male colleagues, but nobody could deny their existence. The German case by comparison is more difficult. Most academics are still convinced that there was no equivalent to Catharine Macaulay and her ilk in the German speaking countries until the end of the nineteenth century.

Who Wrote History in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Germany?

At first sight the history of academic history in Germany is a success story of the late eighteenth century. The historians of the Enlightenment, above all the historians of the so-called Göttingen School gathered around Gatterer and Schlözer, established a new professional role: the academic historian. Thanks to these historians, historiography from then on set out to explain past events rather than simply remembering or reconstructing them. Nobody expressed this concern more precisely than David Hume, who had a deep influence on the German Enlightenment (Reill 1975). One could say that the European Enlightenment introduced causal explanation into historiography (Gawlick and Kreimendahl 1987). From the Enlightenment on it was the duty of a good historian to find the causes of past events and to show that a later event was an effect of a former one. Logically consistent, Hume was convinced that the proof of historical truth lay in the chain of argumentation. The chain of argumentation, however, from his point of view was nothing other than the verbal expression of a natural necessity. Even though teleology was less important for Hume than it was for Macaulay, history then appeared to be an objective process. The past seemed to be interesting not in itself but for its effect on the present.

The predominance of causality as a law of nature and history was questioned only a generation later. After the experience of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars it seemed obvious that history did not follow given rules. Contemporaries gave up the belief in historical causality; they could no longer see anything rational about history or predictable about future events. If a past epoch was worth dealing with – as the famous German historian Leopold von Ranke argued – it was not due to its effects on following epochs but due to its individual value or its inherent worth (Ranke 1970[1854]: 7). For Ranke, the principle of causality seemed to be far less important than the unique individuality of a historical epoch. Ranke and his contemporaries tried to free history from its reduction to a present political function. Today we know that they did not succeed and that Ranke’s students notably contributed to a nationalistic German historiography. At the time, however, the new concept of
historiography was based on the idea of political neutrality. Remember Catharine Macaulay’s point of view: she was convinced that historical truth was a question of the correct political conviction. Ranke on the contrary argued that historical truth does not depend on political conviction. He also refuted Hume’s suggestion that historical truth lies in the causality of past events.

Ranke’s answer to the issue of historical truth sounds quite simple but is in fact revolutionary: historical truth lies, according to Ranke, in the evidence the historian presents, not in the form of a causal chain of arguments but in the form of an adequate historical methodology. This new concept of historical truth had a big influence on ideas of what made a good historian and on the development of academic historiography. With the first historicists of the nineteenth century – among them Herder, Schiller and Ranke – a methodological framework was developed, which was meant to guarantee the quality and the truth of scientific historical studies (Fulda 1996). On the one hand this framework helped to create a professional identity for academic historians, while on the other it also helped to differentiate between professional historians inside and less qualified historians outside universities. This framework was thus both a definition of standards and a criterion of exclusion. At the same time, the canon of historiography was built up. The canon was fixed by historians at universities – like Ranke, Droysen and their successors – who developed a specific methodology for the academic discipline. This creation of a canon was not a conscious act or a conspiracy by some male historians to gain power over female historians. A first step in the process was that, in their lectures or writings, these historians only mentioned and recommended certain academic works to their (male) students and to their readers of both sexes.

When Leopold von Ranke delivered his lectures on the history of England in the 1860s he claimed that David Hume was the first and only historian to have succeeded in writing a concise history of the country. Even though Catharine Macaulay was as successful as David Hume, she was never mentioned by Ranke (see Ranke 1937), and this tradition continued up to the late twentieth century. In an otherwise brilliant essay on British historiography, Jürgen Osterhammel (1992: 282) points out both the similarities and the differences between Ranke, Hume and Thomas Babington Macaulay, but ignores the work of Catharine Macaulay.

The construction of a fixed canon has some important implications for gender issues. If we look at the canon of German historiography it is true that there were no female historians. The early professionalization of the discipline defined the aforementioned methodological framework and the standards for doing history (Smith 1995). These standards relied on specific ways of proving the truth of historical events. They defined how a good historian should demonstrate the objectivity of their narrative (Epplle 2007). In contrast to Catharine Macaulay’s definition of a good historian, a professional historian now had to be objective in terms of political neutrality, this being one of Ranke’s main concerns. This concern might also remind you of David Hume’s effort at banning
a Whig conception of history. Ranke's objectivity, however, no longer relied exclusively on the causality of past events and on the chain of argument. For Ranke, historical truth was seen to be affected by the subjectivity of the historian. This caused new problems. If historical truth depended on the subjectivity of the historian, how could historiography then claim objectivity? To defend history against arbitrary interpretations, the historians created a historical methodology. Historical truth consequently had to be verified in terms of objective evidence, which mostly meant written documents. Women could not fulfill these standards, however, because they had no access to an academic education. Studying at a university was a precondition for true historiography. With the emergence of historical seminars (Historische Seminare), which had been institutionalized in most German universities by the 1870s and 1880s, students learned, for example, how to analyze manuscripts of the early modern period or how to interpret antique papers or coins critically. Only with these skills was the historian able to verify their narrative in terms of evidence.

As a result women and unskilled men were excluded from professional academic history writing. This fact alone would be enough to explain why we cannot find women historians in Germany in the nineteenth century. But it was even worse. The so-called modern way of doing history was not only a question of methodological standards. It was also a question of the very concept of history as such. It was a question of how historians thought about the past and thus how they narrated history (Epple 2003). During the Enlightenment, history seemed to be a teleological process: In Catharine Macaulay's history, for example, we read about the development towards liberty. Hume was less definite in this respect and made the first move toward a new concept of history. Instead of pure teleology with a given aim, he emphasized causality as the main historical principle. After the experience of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars this concept of history could not survive in Germany – at least not among the male intellectual elite. History could not be told any more as a story of a continuous development for the better. This is a well-known fact and many books have been written on this subject (Jgers 1968; Muhlack 1991; Rüsen and Jäger 1992). What makes it so relevant in the present context is that the historian's concept of history not only gave birth to methodological standards, not only abandoned the belief in historical progress but, as a result, also changed the way history was told. It changed the patterns of narration in German historiography (Fulda 1996). If we compare Catharine Macaulay's History of England with Ranke's outline of the same subject we will notice that difference very clearly. Macaulay gives us a story of a continuous development for the better that leads up to a republican form of government. This story may include some setbacks but, in the main, it is an illustration of historical progress. If we read Leopold von Ranke's history of England (Ranke 1859–69) in contrast we do not read such a story of progress. Neither do we read a story driven by the principle of causality. What we read is a self-contained story of an individual part of history. From Ranke's history, you cannot deduce directly any advice for people being in political charge.
Ranke's narrative finds unity in itself. His concern was with the investigation of the particular, even of the single point or moment (Megill 1995: 157–58). The narrated past was thus not tied to a specific function in the present of the historian. Ranke's pattern of narration answers to the historicist's concept of history: present and past are not connected teleologically, there is no visible progress. Instead of a connection there is a qualitative difference between the past and the present.

Historical narratives which imply a continuity between the recorded past and the present of the author, according to Ranke and his followers, can no longer live up to the expectations of academic historiography and the often-hidden claims of a good historian. This indeed marks an epochal turn. Following Michel Foucault (1974: 413–18), I would like to call it an epistemological break. It definitely changed the reception of the bygone patterns of historical narratives. According to the perspective of this new epistemology, all stories of continuity show up as old-fashioned, naive and unsophisticated; in a word: dilettantish. The new era of academic historiography in the twentieth century called itself modern. Non-professional historiography often followed patterns of narration which – according to the new epistemology – were by definition pre-modern.

Women as Historical Writers

Sixty per cent of all articles registered in the index of German periodicals between 1750 and 1815 were published anonymously.² Given this fact, it is notable that women often did not dare write under their own names. Therese Huber (1764–1829), the daughter of a philologist and librarian in Göttingen, was lucky to have access to a large amount of published writings of her time. Like Catharine Macaulay, she had never had a systematic training but relished the opportunity to learn on her own. History was one of her favourite subjects.¹⁰ Even though she wrote many accounts of her journeys, a huge number of letters, narratives and essays during her two marriages, and even though both her husbands supported her writing, she did not publish anything under her own name until 1811 – after her father died (Leuschner 1999: 8). It took her twenty more years to write her first history book. In 1830 she published a history of the wars in the Cevennes, which dealt with the religious upheavals in early modern France (Huber 1834). Therese Huber was no exception in hiding her name from the public. More probably, one could say she was an exception in giving up anonymity. And there were other strategies for making women's achievements invisible. For example, women supported their famous husbands or relatives in collecting historical data, translating or even writing.

These female practices fitted better with the normative discourse of gendered role models. Yet despite this, even in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany women had the agency to act. For example, women played an
important role in the so-called ‘reading revolution’, that is the rapid growth of a middle-class readership and the expansion of the literary market. The growing number of published books and journals enabled more and more women to make a living from their writing. Though the public was more receptive to historical writing in Britain than in Germany, many German readers were also interested in historical settings, whether they be fictional or non-fictional. The enormous popularity of history provoked the conviction that it was desirable for women to have a certain knowledge of the past (Weckel 1998: 533). In contemporary periodicals for families, especially for ladies, one can find small historical portraits of, or comments about, famous persons. Nevertheless, there are no historical articles or essays in the corresponding periodicals explicitly written by a female author. It remains only a suspicion that among these anonymous authors were many women.

If we want to know who wrote history in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany, including women, we have to find a new approach to the definition of historiography. In this regard the successful writer Johanna von Wallenrodt is a good example. Johanna von Wallenrodt (1740–1819) wrote countless courtly novels and romances which were set in the Levant and the Far East. She used the Middle Ages, foreign societies or imagined countries to experiment with gender roles or social hierarchies. History was thus a kind of utopian playground and fiction a good way to conceal the provocative content of her work. Johanna von Wallenrodt is a good example of a female author who played with, but never crossed, the border of fictional and non-fictional narratives. She never wrote history in a narrow sense, though she published an autobiography in two volumes (Wallenrodt 1797), and using the history of her own existence she provided an insight into the everyday life of the lower nobility in the second half of eighteenth-century Germany (Eppe 2003: 167–284).

Women did not have the skills to investigate primary sources in state archives and neither did they have access to official political documents. They did, however, obtain information from relatives and friends and they themselves were eyewitnesses of historical events. So if we do not only look at professional historiography but also at popular historical writings – including historical novels, autobiographies and biographies – we discover new texts beyond the canon, many of them authored by women.

Another example of a woman historian from the late eighteenth century is Louise Johanna Leopoldine von Blumenthal (1742–1808). In 1797 she published a biography of her uncle which was translated only five years later into English under the title The Life of General de Zieten (Blumenthal 1803). For the biography Blumenthal not only investigated Zieten’s correspondence – among it an exchange of letters with King Friedrich II – and other primary sources, she also employed what we would nowadays call ‘oral history’ as she interviewed contemporary witnesses. Thus she wrote a detailed biography of her uncle who had served more than forty years in the army of Friedrich II. She did not, however, focus exclusively on her protagonist but also reconstructed the three
Silesian wars with extraordinary diligence. She even discussed the traditional historiography of her times critically and thus established a relation between her own book and other contemporary interpretations of events. She drew new conclusions from her sources and did not hesitate to question the version Friedrich II himself had given in his history. She also contradicted the contemporaneous historian General von Tempelhof (1783–1801). The latter still counts as an expert in the military history of the Seven Years War (1756–1763), while Blumenthal’s detailed analysis has fallen into oblivion (Lindner 1993). There are some basic similarities between Blumenthal’s concept of history and that of Catharine Macaulay, even though Blumenthal was not in favour of a republic; for example, she was convinced that history was a teleological process for the better. Like Macaulay she was quite self-confident about her female authorship and at the end of the book she named herself a Geschichtsschreiber, or ‘historian’ (Blumenthal 1797). This is the only occasion of a German woman describing herself in this way from this period I have found (Eppe 2003: 363–97).

Another good example of a popular female historian is Johanna Schopenhauer (1766–1838), whose son was the famous and influential philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. Johanna Schopenhauer was well known in the era of the Weimarer Klassik at the beginning of the nineteenth century. She ran a salon, a central meeting point for the literary world of Weimar and was a friend of Johann Wolfgang Goethe and other leading artists and intellectuals of the time. In 1810 she published a biography of her teacher and friend Carl Ludwig Fernow (Schopenhauer 1810). Shortly after Fernow’s death, the most important publisher in early-nineteenth-century Germany, Friedrich Freiherr Cotta von Cottenburg, asked Johanna Schopenhauer to write Fernow’s biography. One reason why Cotta asked a female author and not a male one was probably the relative mediocrity of the protagonist, mediocre in comparison to famous contemporaries like Reinhold, Schiller, Goethe or Hegel. However, his mediocrity was not the main reason; rather, it was the friendship of author and protagonist. Cotta asked Johanna Schopenhauer because she and Fernow had been close friends (Weber 2000: 20), and Schopenhauer used Fernow’s friendship to excuse her female authorship. It was important for her to underline that it had not been her idea to write a book; rather, she felt obliged ‘to edit the following pages’ (Schopenhauer 1810: i) because she knew some important details of Fernow’s life exclusively. In comparison to her contemporary Catharine Macaulay, Johanna Schopenhauer is much more anxious about her female authorship. This is a striking and significant difference because it contrasts with similarities in their methodology: both women historians studied primary sources – Macaulay went to the British Museum and Schopenhauer read a large number of letters and analysed Fernow’s diaries and travelogues.

Macaulay used the documents extensively to sustain her argument. In the first five volumes of her book she named sources in footnotes, but changed method in volume six: ‘The author, having heard that long notes were tedious and disagreeable to the reader, has altered the method which she pursued in the
five first volumes of this history, and at a much larger expense of labour has woven into the text every part of the composition which could be done without breaking into the thread of the history' (Macaulay 1763–83: 15).

The quote expresses her point of view that there is a 'thread of history' which can only be revealed by the historian. For Macaulay, historical truth is not a question of interpretation but of correct conviction and of using skills to find all the hidden documents. History is, according to this epistemology, like a puzzle: the more parts you find, the clearer the picture becomes. Here Macaulay is in agreement with Leopoldine von Blumenthal. Blumenthal also believed that her male colleagues had made mistakes because they had missed relevant documents – and not because history could be a subject of discussion. This conviction fits into the concept of history as a teleological process.

Johanna Schopenhauer also quoted her sources at length, but here similarities with Macaulay or Blumenthal come to an end: Schopenhauer never wove the sources into the text. The biography of Fernow is not a narration but a compilation of what the protagonist himself would have said if he were still alive.

Schopenhauer used sources to re-present history; they were not testimonies of historical truth but history itself. The author disappears behind the sources of the past. Consequently Schopenhauer qualified herself as an editor. To prove the truth, Schopenhauer used alternative strategies: on the one hand she pointed out that she herself was an honest person with an upright and ethical personality. Schopenhauer’s tactic of emphasizing Cotta’s request thus appears in a new light. It is an excuse for her female authorship while also an excellent chance to demonstrate her modesty. But this is not the only truth strategy she employed. As important as her character is her familiarity and close friendship with the protagonist. Often she was an eyewitness of events in his life while friends sometimes entrusted her with details about Fernow’s experiences. She made it very clear through which chain of persons information had come to her. This way she became an ‘ear witness’ of past events (Epple 2003: 329–46).

One could ask whether this difference in truth strategies was determined by the difference in genre. Schopenhauer wrote a simple biography of a not especially well-known contemporary, while Macaulay wrote a serious history of a country. This definitely makes a difference. But Schopenhauer did not just write a biography of a friend addressed to a small number of Weimarian intellectuals. Ultimately the biography was an economic project and Cotta had asked her for the book to make a profit. Apart from its biographical aspects Schopenhauer’s book also analysed the intellectual milieu in Weimar in the first decade of the nineteenth century. And this made the book interesting for many readers all over Germany.
How did the Exclusion Work?

The difference between Johanna Schopenhauer's biography and Catharine Macaulay's history leads us back to questions of gender and the difference between the two genres. Johanna Schopenhauer was not an equal of those of the literary circle for whom she arranged meetings in her salon. When she wrote Fernow's biography she did not live up to the contemporaneous standards of what made a good historian. She did not dare adopt the position of a confident author. Schopenhauer as an author disappeared completely behind her protagonist and the written documents of his life. She tried to hide her subjectivity behind the objective facts of Fernow's life. At the same time, however, when the subjectivity of the author disappeared behind an assumed objectivity of facts, subjectivity came back as a truth strategy: Schopenhauer argued that her character was of such a high morality that the truth of her story could not be questioned. Somewhat paradoxically, the reader only hears the voice of the author when Schopenhauer tries to underlie the truth of her writing. The truth thus lies in the subject of the author. Meanwhile Schopenhauer's concept of history is attached to naive objectivity.

This truth strategy has a long history and can be traced back to ancient rhetoric (Koselleck 1979). Even Macaulay's emphasis on the correct political conviction has something to do with this strategy. Whatever the tradition, this moral truth strategy loses its power in the era of so-called modern historiography. Ranke wrote history with the knowledge of the subjectivity of historical recognition. Having this in mind, the emerging academic discipline of the time claimed scientific objectivity all the same. The historical methodology thus had to guarantee the objective truth of historical writings beyond the subject of their authors. To labour the point, once historical recognition had turned out to be affected by subjectivity, truth strategies had to rely on objectivity.

As a consequence, the morality of a character, the deep feelings of an author for their subject and all mention of emotion became a sign of subjectivity and thus of dilettantism. Historical methodology should both avoid obvious political manipulation and exclude all emotional subjectivity from historiography. Leopold von Ranke and other founding fathers of German academic historiography presumably did not read Catharine Macaulay's History of England. If they had, it would have been difficult for them to condemn it at first sight. According to the new rules of the discipline, Macaulay used a valid truth strategy: she proved the truth with written documents. On second thoughts, however, they would probably have rejected her work because of her old-fashioned concept of history. My main argument here is that Macaulay's History of England could only be a success in the historical context of the Enlightenment. As with Johanna Schopenhauer's biography of Fernow, it is closely attached to a naive concept of historical objectivity. The so-called modern concept of history, however, combined historical objectivity with subjective recognition. In Germany, where historiography became an academic discipline very
early on, the new concept of history rejected the historiography of the Enlightenment. As a result women were completely excluded from writing professional history.

Schopenhauer’s biography is a good example of how the new concept of history contaminated its ‘other’, which was excluded. Schopenhauer’s book helps us to understand how this exclusion worked. Nevertheless there were other women historians who found a more appealing way to solve the problem. In contrast to Johanna Schopenhauer, who tried to hide her authorship behind her protagonist, they carried subjectivity to an extreme. This strategy was almost never combined with political history but with historical writings such as biographies, travelogues, diaries, autobiographies and other works. With their radical subjectivity they not only challenged the truth strategies of the canon but also dealt with an excluded field of professional historiography. Like Leopoldine von Blumenthal, Johanna Schopenhauer or Isabella von Wallenrodt, they dealt with the characters of their protagonists, with ethical values, with friendship and family questions, with death, birth, childhood, love and hatred. Only in the late twentieth century did academic history learn about the importance of what was excluded. What had been once excluded returned partially to the fold as micro history or the history of everyday life. The division of labour between popular and professional historiography was legitimized two hundred years ago. It was an attempt to create a professional identity for academic historians by excluding important themes and those who were seen as unimportant people. We, as professional historians, should leave nothing undone to regain that lost terrain.

Notes

1. According to Claire Brock it was the best selling genre of the period because it was acceptable reading for both sexes and a necessary part of the education (and enlightenment) of eighteenth-century children in Britain (Brock 2006: 48).

2. John Pocock has characterized Macaulay’s commitment to the ancient ideal of active citizenship as being in contrast to her feminist attitude. Like ‘an eighteenth century Hannah Arendt’ she was ‘wholly undeterred by its hyper-intense masculinity’ (Pocock 1998: 251). Kate Davies (2005) argues, however, that the eighteenth-century version of the republican debate was basically different from classical republicanism. The latter relegated the feminine to a private sphere.

3. Claire Brock points out that Macaulay used her own work to reassert her claims to greater authority through continual enhancement of her more scholarly methodologies in comparison to her male rivals (Brock 2006: 49).

4. Horst Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer list sixty-nine universities in German speaking countries (including Austria and Switzerland) with a chair of history in the eighteenth century – church history not included (Blanke and Fleischer 1990: 103–23).

5. The German Aufklärer, according to Reill, admired Hume’s History of England greatly (Reill 1975: 56).
6. This methodology relies on 'documentary, intensive, broad study' and also includes the search for a 'causal nexus' (Ranke 1975a: 78–79).
10. According to Brigitte Leuschner (1999: 6), who analysed Huber's letters, Huber read, for example, Arnold's Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie. Vom Anfange des Neuen Testaments bis auf das Jahr Christi 1688 (Arnold 1967[1729]).
11. Thomas Nipperdey traces the reading revolution in Germany back to the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century (Nipperdey 1983: 587–95). This is certainly true regarding journals and newspapers. Concerning popular literature, the reading revolution began in the second half of the eighteenth century.
12. Except, that is, for small historical portraits in the style of lexicon entries.
13. See also the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (1877: 716–17), where the author of the entry refers explicitly to Schopenhauer's biography. Born the son of a farmer, Carl Ludwig Fernow escaped the Prussian army as a juvenile and, in Lübeck, met the painter Carstens, who became a close friend and teacher. He studied philosophy in Jena, and then worked in Rome for nearly a decade (1794–1803) where he became an art historian and aesthetician. Back in Germany he earned his living as a librarian at the famous Herzogin Anna Amalia library in Weimar. After Fernow's death in 1809 Goethe acquired 1600 Italian books which Fernow had brought back from Rome. See also the website of the Herzogin Anna Amalia library: http://www.klassik-stiftung.de/einrichtungen/herzogin-anna-amalia-bibliothek/ueber-die-bibliothek/geschichte/bestandsgeschichte.html. Retrieved 29 March 2007.
14. Claire Brock underlines the point that Catharine Macaulay wanted the public to gain a profound awareness of the 'living presence behind the composition' of her work (Brock 2006: 52). Macaulay's emphasis on her authorship is not necessarily in contrast to her objective concept of history. Her critique of Hume does not allude to the problem of the subjectivity of historical recognition but only to the problem of whether Hume's delineation was right or wrong.
15. Finally the truth strategy is based upon a certain understanding of civic virtue, attainable by both sexes. For details, see Brock (2006: 56).